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THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE
HAS NOT MADE THE CASE FOR ITS
PROPOSED OVERHAUL OF THE
TAX LITIGATION PROCESS
James P. Holden *
If I had been asked to evaluate the existing system for the litigation of
federal tax issues, I would respond that it works well. I would argue that it
efficiently disposes of a very large volume of cases, employs the skills of spe-
cialized judges in resolving the great bulk of those cases, and blends into the
process an important contribution by generalist article III judges. Further,
it imposes no significant burden on the article III courts and enjoys the con-
fidence and respect of taxpayers and their representatives. An objective ob-
server might say, "Not bad, few other things seem to work so well today,"
and he would be right.
Nevertheless, the Federal Courts Study Committee' (Committee) appar-
ently does not subscribe to the adage that the proof lies in the pudding. This
fifteen-member panel that Congress created to study "problems" facing the
federal courts has identified the tax litigation system as one of those
problems.2 Essentially, it proposes, over a dissent in which five members
joined, to extract all tax cases from the federal district courts, the United
States courts of appeals, the United States Claims Court, and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.' It would allow only the
United States Tax Court to hear tax cases and would restrict review to the
proposed appellate division of the Tax Court.4 The Tax Court would be-
come a judicial hermaphrodite, with both an article I trial division and an
article III appellate division.5
• Mr. Holden is a partner in the Washington, D.C., office of Steptoe & Johnson and
former Chair of the American Bar Association, Section on Taxation.
1. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL
COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 31-33 (Apr. 2, 1990) [hereinafter FEDERAL COURTS REPORT];
Ginsburg, Commentary: The Federal Courts Study Committee on Claims Court Tax Jurisdic-
tion, 40 CATH. U.L. REV. 631, 631 n.1 (1991). This Commentary is a reply to Professor
Ginsburg and to the FEDERAL COURTS REPORT.
2. FEDERAL COURTS REPORT, supra note I, at 69.
3. Id. at 70.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 70-71 & fig. 2.
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This proposal is all the more surprising because the Committee goes out of
its way to condemn, as a general proposition, the concept of specialized
courts. In the "Overview" portion of its report, the Committee catalogues
the deficiencies of specialized courts: "the danger of tunnel vision, the dan-
ger of 'capture'. . . [by] interest group[s]," 6 the risk of political imbalance,
the need to resolve cases that cross lines of specialization, the premature
suppression of the diverse views that arise from intercircuit conflicts, and,
finally, the fact that "most American lawyers find the idea of specialized
courts repugnant." 7 This is an impressive list of concerns, but, in the end,
the Committee majority disregards them when it comes to tax law.
The Committee's first sentence in justification of its sweeping tax proposal
states: "The present system of federal tax adjudication is irrational, fosters
conflict in the interpretation of the tax laws, can be unfair to some taxpayers,
encourages forum shopping, and provides additional incentives for taxpayers
to play the 'audit lottery.' "" To the uninformed this sounds strong, but
when one considers these assertions on the merits, they fall well short of
their intended mark.
The charge of irrationality is an extravagant overstatement. Congress,
acting within the scope of its authority, created the existing system for ap-
propriate purposes.9 The system is not the unreasoned product of incompe-
tence. The contention that the present tax litigation system "fosters
conflict"" ° is also hyperbole. The existing tax litigation system produces no
more conflict than the federal court system generally, whether the subject is
labor law, criminal law, civil rights law, or any other equally significant
field. " All such litigation generates intercircuit conflicts. But, as noted
6. Id. at It.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 69.
9. See generally H. DUBROFF, THE UNITED STATES TAX COURT: AN HISTORICAL
ANALYSIS (1979).
10. FEDERAL COURTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 69.
11. See, e.g., Estreicher & Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme Court's Responsi-
bilities: An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 681, 810 (1984) ("Moreover, our study does
not identify any significant number of conflicts in the tax area that are left unresolved by the
Court .. "); Special Project, An Empirical Study of Intercircuit Conflicts on Federal Income
Tax Issues, 9 VA. TAX REV. 125, 138-39 (1989) (study of 618 appellate court cases for 1983
through 1987 identified only "thirty five explicit conflicts, sixteen implicit conflicts, and five
side swipes .... The Supreme Court had the opportunity to hear thirty-eight of the cases
involved in a conflict. It denied certiorari to twenty-six and granted certiorari to two that it
has not yet decided. The Court affirmed another six cases and reversed four.") (footnote omit-
ted); Saltzman, Should There be a National Court of Tax Appeals?, 8 A.B.A. SEC. TAX
NEWSL., No. 4, at 61, 77 (Summer 1989) ("There simply is no data to support the notion that
diverse appellate decisions are a frequent problem in tax cases."); Memorandum from Acting
Deputy Attorney General Edward S.G. Dennis, Jr. and Assistant Attorney General (Tax Divi-
[Vol. 40:639
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above, the Committee generally welcomes the "diverse views" that arise
from intercircuit conflicts. 12 This is not so, however, where the diverse
views relate to tax law.13
Further, the Committee's allegation that the system is unfair to some tax-
payers is suspect. Congress created the Tax Court to provide all taxpayers
with the opportunity for a preassessment judicial review of deficiencies as-
serted by the Internal Revenue Service. 4 It is difficult to characterize this
action as fundamentally unfair to any taxpayer, rich or poor. If the conten-
tion is that all taxpayers should have equal judicial access regardless of their
economic circumstances, the straightforward way to do that is to make the
jurisdiction of the Tax Court and the article III courts fully concurrent. In
contrast, the Committee's proposal would deny all taxpayers the right to
litigate before a jury, the right to select a court in their district, and the right
to have their case decided by a generalist article III judge.' 5 It is difficult to
accept the proposition that the Committee's recommendations create greater
fairness.
By listing "forum shopping" as a negative feature of the current system,
the Committee's report simply adopts a pejorative term where a more neu-
tral one, such as "choice of forum," would suffice.' 6 The report, however, is
silent on this point. If the Committee favors change on this ground, it
should explain why choice of forum detracts from the effectiveness of the
existing system, or why denying taxpayers that choice would result in a bet-
ter system. Finally, the report adds the questionable charge that the current
system "provides additional incentives for taxpayers to play the 'audit lot-
tery.' ",v The audit lottery is a product of federal unwillingness to commit
adequate resources to the audit of tax returns.'" It has little, if anything, to
sion) Shirley D. Peterson to Attorney General Dick Thornburgh 7 (Oct. 16, 1989) (attached to
ABA SECTION OF TAXATION, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (Feb. 1990)) ("it ap-
pears that unresolved intercircuit conflicts are rare and that their impact on tax administration
is de minimus").
12. FEDERAL COURTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 11. The Committee stated that speciali-
zation might create "the danger of premature suppression of diverse views (intercircuit con-
flicts enable experimentation with competing solutions to the same problems-while at the
same time making law more complex and creating problems of compliance for institutions and
individuals that do business or conduct activity in more than one circuit)." Id
13. Id at 70. The proposed tax adjudication structure "would increase the quality and
uniformity of tax adjudication by shifting it from overworked judges sitting in a large number of
diverse courts to a single court of highly trained specialist& " Id. (emphasis added).
14. See H. DUBROFF, supra note 9, at 1-46.
15. FEDERAL COURTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 70.
16. Id at 69.
17. Id.
18. See Portuondo, Abusive Tax Shelters Legal Malpractice, and Revised Formal Ethics
Opinion 346: Does Revised 346 Enable Third Party Investors to Recover from Tax Attorneys
1991]
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do with the structure of the tax litigation system, a system that generally
comes into play only after an audit has produced proposed adjustments in
liability.
It is my impression, after thirty years of tax practice, that most tax law-
yers would concede that the current tax litigation system is not tidy. It
might even be considered ungainly. But we should not lightly discard sys-
tems that work well on these grounds. If ungainly products should be dis-
carded, the Internal Revenue Code itself would surely be at high risk. Tax
lawyers have learned to live in an untidy and ungainly world and can endure
a tax litigation system that reflects these characteristics. If housecleaning is
in order, there are better places to start.
As we might expect, Professor Ginsburg does not rely only on these slen-
der reeds that the Committee has advanced to support its proposal. 9 But,
he does appear to subscribe to the Committee's irrationality claim when he
confesses an inability to shake the conviction that the current system is
crazy. If by this he means "untidy," we do not disagree on characteriza-
tion. We differ, however, on the consequences of that characterization.
Professor Ginsburg's other objections are more substantive. I do not,
however, find them persuasive. Take the cases of Donald W. Fausner2' and
Robert A. Hitt22 and their burdensome bags. Professor Ginsburg objects to
the fact that, because each of them chose ultimately to reside in a different
circuit, each winds up subject to the appellate court interpretation applicable
within his circuit. 3 While that is true, it is hardly reason to overhaul the
system. If Donald and Robert each had commenced his own burdensome
bag litigation in the federal district court of his ultimate residence, the same
conclusion would likely have resulted. The fact that they instead com-
menced their litigation in a single court of national jurisdiction does not
make the result unacceptably burdensome. Those who say otherwise seem
to believe that one must view intercircuit conflicts in the tax law differently
from intercircuit conflicts in other areas of the law. Why an early need for
certainty and uniformity overcomes the acknowledged benefits of diverse
views and the considered development of the tax law through the same ro-
bust process that governs other federal litigation is not immediately appar-
Who Violate its Standards?, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 220, 223 n.30 (1986) (stating that" 'au-
dit lottery' refers to the ability of a taxpayer to take undisclosed aggressive positions in his
return with little fear of an audit and less fear of the imposition of penalties because the IRS
reviews relatively few tax returns and assesses even fewer deficiencies").
19. Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 633-37.
20. Id. at 633.
21. Fausner v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 620 (1971).
22. Hitt v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 628 (1971).
23. Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 634.
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ent. The proponents may be right, but they have yet to make their case
persuasively.
Toward the end of his discussion, Professor Ginsburg focuses on a major
concern relating to the Committee's proposal that all tax appeals be concen-
trated in a new appellate division of the Tax Court.24 Professor Ginsburg's
concern relates to the quality of decision-making to be expected from that
relatively final tribunal. If taxpayers can take their appeals only to such a
court, a court in which the government appears as a party in every case,
there are clear risks of "tunnel vision" and government orientation, risks of
the kind that cause the Committee to reject generally the concept of special-
ized courts.25 These risks could in turn produce taxpayer distrust and doubt
as to fairness-an atmosphere in sharp contrast to the widespread taxpayer
acceptance enjoyed by the current system.
Where Professor Ginsburg and I differ is in our reaction to that risk. He
is content to rest on the conclusion that "if the [appellate judges] are fair,
experienced, expert tax lawyers, in short order their panel decisions will dis-
pel the taxpayer distrust and doubts of fairness that so concern the Ameri-
can Bar Association's Tax Section."26 I would prefer that Professor
Ginsburg exhibit more skepticism here, as I have known him to do in other
contexts where substantially less has been at risk. His conclusion is a little
bit like telling me that if the weather is fair tomorrow, I can stop worrying
about bad weather tomorrow. I have no control over the weather. Accord-
ingly, if bad weather will prejudice my activities, my worry about the
weather is reality-based. Similarly, I have no control over the judicial selec-
tion process and yet expect to be adversely impacted by anything less than
the selection of the finest judges. Thus, my worry on this score is also real-
ity-based. I know, however, that the higher the number of citizens who have
an interest in a particular judicial selection, the more careful the selection
process is likely to be. For that reason, it is preferable to leave the tax appel-
late jurisdiction in the existing courts of appeals.
In short, it seems that those who advocate change in the existing system
have the burden of establishing that it does not work, or at the minimum
that the proposed system will work significantly better. In this regard, the
Committee has failed. The inadequacies that the Committee ascribes to the
present system are either inaccurate or insignificant. The more substantive
point raised by Professor Ginsburg, regarding Donald and Robert, does not
distinguish tax law from other litigation areas. We are thus left with the
24. Id. at 635-36.
25. FEDERAL COURTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 11.
26. Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 636.
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proposition that we should abandon a very effective litigation structure sim-
ply because its architecture is not elegant. I have no problem in rejecting
that proposition.
In addressing the Committee's alternative contention that the Claims
Court and the Federal Circuit should be excluded from this area of the law,
however, the question remains: "Why?" Those who propose the change
bear the burden of explaining why it will result in a better life for all. The
Committee says nothing on this score, and the answer is not self-evident. By
exercising jurisdiction over tax trials, the Claims Court does not seem to be
creating any problems for any other court, for any taxpayer, or for the gov-
ernment, and neither the Committee nor Professor Ginsburg has identified
any. With respect to the tax appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit,
Professor Ginsburg argues that a taxpayer victory in that court leads all
other taxpayers to follow the piper to the same forum." While that may be
true, he does not state why the result is bad. If the government is aggrieved
by the favorable taxpayer result, the government exercises a far more persua-
sive voice than do taxpayers in seeking Supreme Court review (even where
there is no intercircuit conflict) or in seeking legislative correction. Taxpay-
ers of moderate means rarely experience difficulty in financing litigation that
has a high probability of success. Consequently, the advance payment re-
quirement is unlikely to bar access to the court in the postulated situation of
a favorable Federal Circuit precedent.
Nevertheless, if someone were to make the case successfully that the rela-
tive finality of Federal Circuit decisions is intolerable, that problem could be
abrogated without depriving the Claims Court of tax trial jurisdiction. In
tax cases, appeals from the Claims Court could be routed to the taxpayer's
circuit of residence, as is the case with appeals from the Tax Court. I do not
raise this point to advocate such a change, but simply to illustrate that ad-
justments can be made to the present system without resort to the dramatic
surgery that the Committee proposed.
In short, I submit that abandoning efforts to beautify the tax litigation
system will better serve taxpayers, the federal government, and the tax pro-
fession. The tax litigation system should be left alone to dispose of huge
volumes of tax controversies in its quick and efficient manner.
27. Id. at 633.
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